Tuesday, September 27, 2011

Kenneth Burke: Blog Two, aka: You should probably stop reading now

Burke 2: “But speech in its essence is not neutral. Far from aiming at suspended judgment, the spontaneous speech of a people is loaded with judgments. It is intensely moral — its names for objects contain the emotional overtones which give us the cues as to how we should act towards theses objects…to call a [wo]man a friend or an enemy is per se to suggest a program of action with regard to [her]/him”(177).


Since last class I have been trying to decide if I am a materialist or an idealist (or something else entirely?) To me, these two aforementioned terms are too polarizing, but because I didn’t even really know what they meant, I figured I would spend some time with them during this week’s reading. This is also in light of Foust’s asking me to think of what to do with multiple and competing perspectives, which these different lineages of philosophy have.

The reason I bring this up, in the context of this quotation, is that to name or claim a certain identification with one of these terms is not a morally neutral act; meaning, claiming a materialist identity means something beyond the saying of it. From a critical cultural and performance aspect, it makes a lot of sense to think that speech and the signs that compose speech making, would be situated in larger contexts. Judgments seem to arise from our orientations, which are facilitated and maintained through our various contexts. To Burke, it seems the greatest context is that of piety, not only religious, but the devotion to what is right and wrong. To Burke, it seems this orientation guides the majority of our speech patterns.

But it isn’t that words, signs, symbols, speech are only contextual—but they are laden with emotion and affects (or the pre-linguistic impulse.) Maybe these too are based on context as well, and apt to change. But naming something evokes certain emotional currents in and through the body, so that a name has a visceral response. I am sure that my dog does not know what a name is, or even what “her” name is. However, when I say the sign, “Indigo,” she looks up. Her ears perk up and she often comes over to me. She does not know I-N-D-I-G-O is her name, but she knows the feelings/responses she gets to certain stimuli (my words/touch etc.) Is my dog’s name moral? In some ways yes, because I was the one who renamed her, when the name “Pepper” seemed too banal, and almost platitudinous for her black and white spotted coat. While she is a dog, there is still an amount of power that I am able to wield over her. Something similar can happen for the names we give people, the names we categorize them as— brown, black, white, gay, straight, friend or enemy. We have visceral responses to names, they can evoke a myriad of thoughts and feelings, and by labeling something as different or other, we are able to separate it, orient ourselves away from it, or towards it, or left wondering what to do when orienting oneself one way works in one situation and not another.

So am I a materialist? No. Nor am I an idealist. Materialism seems too intertwined with Marxism, and idealism is too tied up with well, ideals and not enough with material realities. But material realities are only understood through the ideas that make them what they are. So what’s left? Post-structuralism, with an intervention by queer/feminist scholars of color? Seems fitting to me. As for competing ideas and having to make sense of them—I think most ideas work well in tandem with other ideas, so that we can combine materialism and idealism, and post-structuralism, and feminism to allow ourselves an even deeper understanding of something. I think this has to be the case with naming something and with language more generally. Having multiple approaches to understanding language is useful, and it isn’t as though there are completely infinite options, but enough to really dig through the depth that is language making/using. Would Burke agree? I don’t know, but he’s taking on a huge project, so I can’t imagine he would be totally closed off to the idea of multiple interpretations, orientations, and motives.

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